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De The history of the islamic state. a 16 de Novembro de 2015 às 14:35
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...The tribal regions are, generally, stuck in the 10th or 11th century in terms of their thinking, as evidenced by their hereditary distribution of power, fundamentalist religiosity, and lack of industry. The most dangerous tribes are those like the Saudis, who have vast wealth and thus access to all of the First World’s weapons. The al-Saud tribe derives its rule from internal religious authorities. People like Zarqawi and bin Laden were essentially looking to replicate the example of the al-Saud’s elsewhere in the world. In Zarqawi’s case, it was Iraq; in bin Laden’s, Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda’s leadership are religious scholars. Bin Laden himself was probably an adept of Islamic theology, although it is equally likely that he purchased his Islamic "degree" and flaunted it as proof of his authority given how wealthy he was relative to his contemporaries. Although I used the colonial analogy, I also like to think of Al Qaeda and similar organizations as being the Muslim analogs to the Catholic Church in the medieval era, back when they sent mercenaries on "Crusades" to conquer foreign, un-Christian lands. Like the Crusaders, these al Qaeda operatives traverse the world in search of apostates to kill and a land upon which to establish their holy state.

It is my opinion that the reason why there are sects in the first place is due to the fact that one warlord using religious "authority" runs up against another person using the same religious authority and they essentially split off into divergent and antagonistic religio-tribal organizations. In the Arab world, the people who obsessively accuse others of apostasy as a pretext for violence are called Takfiris. This term is used in a pejorative manner, as the strategy of declaring enemies to be apostate is well known and has been performed throughout history by troublemakers. ISIS is the best example of a Takfiri organization. Takfirism is analogous to the prevalent tactic in the West conflating adversaries with Hitler and Nazis, or as “enemies of democracy.”

2011

The two critical events that occurred in 2011 were the civil wars in Libya and Syria, as well as the US withdrawal from Iraq.

The fall of Gaddafi produced a strategic situation which saw Libyan jihadists, with the help of US air support, overrun Libya. What resulted was a situation where these jihadists opened up Gaddafi’s weapons stores to every other Jihadi group in the Middle East to purchase, and the war in Syria was the primary market for these "liberated" arms caches. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar were making several airlifts and cargo shipments from Libya to Turkey and back in order to facilitate the dispensation of weapons to an assortment of rebels, including ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, the "official" al-Qaeda franchise in Syria. These arms ended up reenergizing the jihadist movement in Syria.

So, ironically, the United States, in destabilizing Libya, helped to pave the way for the rise of ISIS when a flood of fresh Libyan weapons came into their hands, most notably antitank and even anti-air weapons. The Libyan intervention is likely to go down as one of the greatest blunders of American foreign policy, as it has created yet another jihadist outpost, this time on African soil.

The war in Syria, unlike the Libyan conflict, is defined as a sectarian war similar to the Iraq’s. The "president" of Syria (really just the leader of the largest fighting force) is Bashar al-Assad, a member of the Alawite sect of Islam. To Sunni jihadists, rule by an apostate Alawite is obviously unacceptable, and he is thus a great target for Takfirist defamation, especially given the fact that Syria is 80% Sunni. It was easy to paint Assad as a committed oppressor of Sunnis given these circumstances, and such sentiment was greatly fueled by the fact that the Sunnis were largely the losers of Iraq’s civil war and perpetual victims of a continuing Shiite conspiracy to dominate Sunni Islam. However, not to say Assad is even remotely a good guy, but his wife is a Sunni, and much of his army and its command are Sunnis as well. In other words, the idea that Assad is necessarily sectarian is false.

As the Libyan and Syrian wars ensued and set each respective country back a hundred years or more, the US ...


De the history of the islamic state. a 16 de Novembro de 2015 às 14:37
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As the Libyan and Syrian wars ensued and set each respective country back a hundred years or more, the US began its preparations to leave Iraq in 2011. Part of this meant that they would cease their payments to the Sahwa militias, instantaneously leaving vast swathes of Sunni street thugs unemployed and politically marginalized. In arming these militias, the Americans had created a state-within-a-state situation. According to Cigar, The central government had no authority to rein these militias in, and integrating the militias into the armed forces had failed.

What ensued after the US withdrawal was the fracturing of the "central" (really Shiite, Baghdad-based) government along sectarian lines. The Shiite Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, sent Shiite troops to occupy the Sunni towns in Iraq, where they massacred civilians, and deposed Sunni politicians. Maliki even sentenced a former Sunni vice president, who served up until 2009, to death in absentia.

Simultaneously, because of the sectarian overtones of the Syrian war, Sunni donors from the Gulf states began to contribute vast amounts of money to al Qaeda central leadership in the Af-Pak tribal belt in order to fund the jihad against Assad. Al Qaeda subsequently increased the funding of its Iraqi cells to join the fight in Syria, as they were still operational on the Syrian border. ISI operatives were to infiltrate Syria under the organizational title "Jabhat al-Nusra" (JN), which translates to "The Front of Helpers."

Due to the fact that many former Sahwa militiamen were now broke with the departure of the United States, and because there was little use for their skills as career thugs outside the army in Iraq’s economy, many joined the fight in Syria under facilitation by JN. JN thus found a stable base within Iraq from which they could launch strikes into Syria. This Qaeda-tribal realignment represents another pivotal point in the history of ISIS.

US destabilization of Syria

In its support for toppling Assad by aiding the Syrian rebels, many of whose allegiances exist in a state of flux and who have defected to ISIS, the US essentially made it possible for ISIS to rise and take command of eastern Syria. While you can argue that Washington probably didn’t directly arm and train ISIS, it nonetheless facilitated and supported a chaos scenario where ISIS could rise to the top of the jihadist hierarchy.

Ironically, in 2010, Assad offered to assist the US in a war against Takfiri rebels operating on the Iraqi-Syrian border. Assad’s government has fought jihadists for decades and considered themselves “experts” on the affair. The US refused and, in 2011, they armed jihadists instead to depose Assad.

Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS

JN quickly gained a reputation as being the most extreme (and most effective) rebel fighting group in Syria. They were better funded, better trained, and many had had years of experience fighting US occupation forces in Iraq. One of the byproducts of wars is the creation of a class of experienced fighters. While many militants die in these infantry-based guerilla wars, the ones who survive tend to be resilient given their experience advantage. JN had a great number of survivors from conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.

Furthermore, the extreme factions will often find the best recruits and people most willing to join up with their cause. If you look at the history of statehood in general, it is usually the most murderous and extreme of the militias who rise to power. This was true of the Leninists in Russia, the Zionists in Palestine, and it appears ISIS in Iraq/Syria.

JN eventually fractured, however, forming a splinter group called the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (Sham = Levant in Arabic). Effectively, the ISI fraction of JN had gotten "too extreme” for al Qaeda’s tastes. Perhaps too much of Zarqawi’s ghost had lived on in the organization. This schism precipitated bloodshed between JN members and the newly formed ISIS, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. JN was getting a lot of negative press in the West and the greater Middle East because of its penchant for using massacres as a tool for terrorizing populations into submission, as well as other heinous crimes such as mass rapes of female captives and wanton looting. Ironic..


De the history of the islamic state. a 16 de Novembro de 2015 às 14:42
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...heinous crimes such as mass rapes of female captives and wanton looting.

Ironically, ISIS practiced Takfirism against JN in order to justify its split.

The schism was likely a calculated move on the part of ISIS, who were now the main players on the Iraqi-Syrian border. They did not need AQ central leadership because they had enough support from the Iraqi tribal system to survive and thrive.

ISIS

What distinguished ISIS from the rest of the militias operating in Syria was that it had a coherent goal of statehood in mind, while other groups were just focused on toppling Assad. The state-building project entailed a focus on combat, but also a considerable attention was given to subduing the civilian population through propaganda and terror. The group was experienced in both facets of sowing the seeds of statehood, having had years of practice in Iraq and in other conflicts around the globe, most notably the Chechen-Russian wars.

ISIS also has an international angle, unlike the Syrian and Iraqi nationalist militias. This international focus gives them access to a far larger pool of recruits, and has enabled them to link up with several other jihadist factions across the world, notably the Chechen jihadists and other fighters across Europe and the Caucuses. The Chechens are also highly experienced fighters, having fought the Russians for years, and so they constitute one of the most deadly fighting forces in Iraq and Syria. The field commander of ISIS operates under the field name Abu Omar al-Shishani (literally Abu Omar The Chechen).

ISIS’s breakout moment was their June 2014 invasion of northern Iraq, which began with a jailbreak of thousands of Sunni prisoners from Iraqi military jails. In the eyes of ISIS, the Iraqi military are essentially a Shiite militia, referring to them pejoratively as the "Army of the Safavids," with Safavid being a reference to medieval Persian, Shiite rulers of Mesopotamia.

Following this jailbreak, ISIS launched a blitz on northern Iraq, seizing Mosul, Iraq’s oil-rich, and second largest city, as well as taking control of towns all over western and central Iraq. The US-trained Iraqi army, which took billions of dollars and years to create, effectively collapsed in 24 hours. 30,000 Iraqi troops shrank back in the face of about 3,000 ISIS militiamen, resulting in one of the greatest military routs in the region’s history.

If you remember how I mentioned previously that a great deal of this jihadist doctrine is tied into the militias viewing themselves as walking the path of the ancient, “untainted” Muslims around the time of Muhammad, then this episode featuring the ISIS blitzkrieg unto Iraq was a fulfillment of prophecy in the minds of Sunnis and ISIS. The original Muslim conquests of Mesopotamia and the Levant proceeded in the same blitz fashion, where a small army of Muslims conquered Byzantine and Persian armies which often outnumbered them by 4 or 5 times. The conquest by ISIS affirmed in the minds of Sunnis that history was repeating itself as the "true Muslims" routed the infidels thanks to the grace of god and the holiness of their mission.

However, the real story is less fantastical. ISIS had only took over the Sunni areas of Iraq which were under effective occupation by Shiite forces. Shiite troops and even the Sunnis serving alongside them in the Iraqi army had no interest in losing their lives for the sake of a corrupt authority in Baghdad bent on policing a disparate Sunni population. They dropped their guns, ran and were summarily routed by ISIS. Shiites were executed and Sunnis were spared as part of an ISIS amnesty program for their fellow Sunnis who had gone “wayward.” The sparing of the lives of Sunnis is actually a development in the tactics of ISIS, as they were against such amnesty policies in their past, less compromising iterations, notably under Zarqawi.

ISIS publicized images and video of the rout and ensuing capture of hundreds of Shiite troops, executing them on camera in systematic fashion. This represented Iraq officially splitting on its sectarian lines. Because the Iraqi Army left their equipment largely intact, ISIS got access to tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters (which they don’t know how to use yet), and a large amount of ammun...


De the history of the islamic state. a 16 de Novembro de 2015 às 14:45
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... Because the Iraqi Army left their equipment largely intact, ISIS got access to tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters (which they don’t know how to use yet), and a large amount of ammunition, uniforms, and other types of hardware to help them consolidate rule over north and central Iraq. In addition, they robbed the central bank of Mosul and other banks across Iraq which led to them claiming up to 400 million dollars in cash.

In addition to the arms and cash, ISIS also seized the precious bounty of oil fields across northern Iraq and now makes perhaps 3 million a day in black market oil sales according to experts. Cash and oil has made ISIS self-sufficient, and it is perhaps this conquest strategy is a large reason why they abandoned al Qaeda central leadership to begin with. ISIS had no intention on sharing the spoils of their hard-fought labor with an isolated leadership far away from the battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The success of ISIS has led hundreds of people from Europe and other parts of the world streaming into the area under ISIS control to pledge allegiance to their organization, with some estimated 6,300 aspiring jihadists migrating to Syria and Mesopotamia in the month of July 2014 alone.

Upon conquering northern and central Iraq, ISIS changed its name to the Islamic State (IS), and declared Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim. Upon declaration of the restoration of the Caliphate, the Kurds also formally announced their plans to break from the Iraqi central government, hearkening the subsequent rebirth of Kurdistan.

In response to the ISIS takeover, Obama sent 300 advisors to Iraq. Ironically, the Iranian revolutionary guards are also in Iraq at the time of this writing to help bolster the defenses of Baghdad in expectation of an ISIS push to take control of Baghdad. At the end of August, Obama announced yet another 300 troops were to be sent back to Mesopotamia following the execution of American reporter James Foley and ISIS threats to murder another, Steven Sotloff.

The Islamic State and Kurdistan

The Kurds are dispersed throughout the Middle East, although they have a large territory in the Northeast of Iraq in the mountain ranges between Iraq and Iran and on the border with Turkey. Ironically, this is where Zarqawi initially found refuge when he fled Afghanistan.

ISIS began operations on Kurdistan in late July of this year, but prior to the commencement of those hostilities, they had been rooting out religious minorities under their dominion in Mosul and Anbar province. The message to the non-Sunnis was to convert to Islam or pay a "jizya," which is essentially a tax for not being a Sunni Muslim. After a short period, ISIS arbitrarily changed the message to "leave or die," thus triggering an exodus of Christians from northern Iraq.

After the Christians, the jihadists turned their sights on the Kurds, and the opening of this front is where the line in the sand was drawn by the United States. In the geopolitical theater, Obama had no intentions on allowing ISIS to usurp Kurdistan, as such a development posed a grave threat to the geopolitical balance in the region as it would place ISIS on the borders of both Iran and Turkey.

Iraqi Kurdistan is a socially divided entity. There are Salafi jihadist Kurds who generally are youth and low caste tribesmen. Kurds are also mostly Sunni Muslim, which would have meant that the transnational ISIS would possibly be able to incorporate Kurdistan as one of its "emirates."

The Kurdish leadership has a good relationship with Washington, as they were the chief, unflinching collaborators with the US occupation. They are also considered a vital part of the intelligence apparatus in the greater Middle East area, as they work with Mossad and the CIA to spy on neighboring Iran.

International outcry came about once ISIS added the Yezidi religious group to its genocidal hit list, leading to a set of massacres and the hot pursuit of a civilian Yezidi population up Shingal Mountain. The Yezidis began dying of thirst in the caves of their makeshift stronghold in the ensuing ISIS siege and it was at this time that the Americans made a humanitarian air drop to them while the world watched on. Assistance to Yezidis facing genocide was ...


De .the history ... ISIS ... e índice. a 16 de Novembro de 2015 às 15:05
The History of the Islamic State

by Walead Farwana, 24/8/2014
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... Assistance to Yezidis facing genocide was the political cover story for launching airstrikes on ISIS. The way I see Washington’s message to ISIS is “don’t mess with the Kurds, you can have everything else.”

While Obama was probably willing to tolerate the Sunni parts of Iraq falling to ISIS, the Kurdish regions were a red line. This is evidenced by the fact that there was no vitriolic reaction to the fall of Mosul and the drive of ISIS toward Baghdad. In fact, the central government of Iraq essentially had to turn to the Russians, who are allied with Assad and Iran, in order to assist them with the vital problems facing their rule in Iraq. Furthermore, there is the question as to why NATO member Turkey never sought to crush ISIS, despite the fact that they were willing to go as far as to stage a false flag attack on their own civilians to justify such a measure. Perhaps the US did not trust the Turks enough not to violate the sovereignty of the Kurds, whom they have been in on-and-off wars with for decades.

The relatively muted US response, which includes only limited airstrikes, and only airstrikes in ISIS’s Iraqi half, could be because it wants to keep ISIS intact enough that it continues to constitute a thorn in the side of Iran on its eastern border and Assad in the West. Perhaps Washington has learned its lesson regarding the dangers of creating power vacuums. The best case scenario for Washington may be a prolonged war between the Sunnis of Iraq and the Levant and the Shiite countries bordering them.

Notes on the Kurds

The information I’m including below is not to vilify Kurds, but rather to provide some clarity about the people who Washington is supporting.

Kurdish rule in Iraq is essentially a dictatorship led by the Barzani clan. It is a tribal area, like the culture of their Sunni Arab adversaries. In 2011, they violently suppressed protests by their fellow Kurds protesting the Barzani dictatorship. It is also an area where female genital mutilation is considered normal and, despite a nominal “ban” in response to Western pressure, the practice continues unabated. Note, male genital mutilation is also endemic across the Middle East, although it is FGM which generally gets Westerners up in arms, so I highlight this because it flies in the face of the narrative purported by the US government that it is assisting a free, democratic bastion of civilization against murderous religious fanatics. Truth is, it is one medieval set of people clashing with against another set of people whose psychologies lie somewhere between the invention of the agriculture and the Industrial Revolution.

Notes on US involvement

I think it is necessary to recap how the US helped precipitate this crisis:
1. They invaded Iraq, thus upsetting the balance of power there and leaving a vacuum to be filled by Zarqawi and JTJ
2. They pursued a policy of sectarian divide-and-conquer, thus effectively setting up sectarian military boundaries in Iraq when they simultaneously armed Sunni tribes alongside the Shiite-dominated central government
3. The attack on Libya that toppled Gaddafi created the rise of jihadists there and a subsequent flood of weapons into Syria that bolstered ISIS
4. US support for rebel groups in Syria undermined Assad who was a bulwark against Jihadism in the region, again bolstering ISIS

-------- Walead Farwana is an American researcher, writer, and amateur historian currently residing in Chicago, Illinois. He graduated from the University of Michigan in 2011 with a Bachelor’s degree in biology. Walead is fluent in Arabic, with over a year of Middle East travel under his belt. You can follow him on Twitter @Walled_Farana
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Islamic State, ISIS, DAESH, Terrorists, Jihad, ... AlQaeda,


índex:

-- Jama’at al Tawhid w’al Jihad
-- Iraqi Tribal System
-- Sectarian violence in Iraq during the US occupation
-- Islam and tribalism
-- JTJ metamorphoses into Al Qaeda in Iraq
-- Sahwa Militias and the disintegration of the Iraqi state
-- Describing Jihadi Organizations
-- 2011
-- US destabilization of Syria
-- Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS
-- ISIS
-- The Islamic State and Kurdistan
-- Notes on the Kurds
-- Notes on US involvement
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